Tag Archives: Avi Sagi

Avi Sagi, Casualties of Worship—Reshit II

The prolific author Avi Sagi has an article on prayer. Sagi’s prior work was to create a pluralistic traditionalism of an open canon, non-metaphysical positions based on Wittgenstein, Leibowitz and Goldman, and more recently to propose a Gadamer reading of the tradition. For our prior discussions on Sagi, see here and here.
In the last issue of Reshit, Avi Sagi has a long article “Casualties of Worship: Tefilah after the death of God- a Phenomenological Inquiry into Hebrew Literature.” The article is selected pages from a forthcoming book on the topic. Html- here and pdf – here

Sagi wants to return us to prayer in our post-secular age through a sensitive reading of Israeli poetry- connecting the themes of secular Israeli poets to those of Rav Nahman and Rav Kook. The overall effect is his advocating prayer as a personal act in which people express existential themes. Even though he is footnoted only once, the project seems to continue the work of Eliezer Schweid in seeking to create an Israeli Jewish culture.

Sagi argues that prayer after the death of God and expressing one’s disbelief is still in front of God; it is still a religious act. It is not atheist or theist, rather a presence and then absence. Sagi rejects those who seek dialogue and connection with God. Buber wanted I-Thou presence as did William James and A J Heschel. Sagi claims that these experiential approaches have no real transcendental available. Prayer in Sagi’s reading is about the self. It is about the human subject. Sagi offers us the Kierkegaard’s struggle, Camus acceptance of fate, and Feuerbach’s prayer as the alter ego of the person.

From this modernist idealistic and existential base, Sagi analyzes a broad spectrum of Israeli writers most of whom were formed in the early part of the twentieth century including Yizhak Lamdan, Abba Kovnor, Uri Zvi Greenberg, Sim Shalom, Brenner, and Amir Gilboa. This book will offer the Israeli high school teacher a way of re-tooling for an era when there is less of a religious –secular divide. Everyone is now existential religious. The early poems of Amichai are not read as sardonic or cynical, rather as noble and religious. Amir Gilboa whom once upon a time was considered by critics as too exilic, too Jewish, and too metaphysical, and not secular, rebellious, or expressive enough—is used by Sagi to transition into the very human prayers of Rav Nachman and Rav Kook. Gilboa is associated with the secular in order to show how close they are to the religious.

Israeli poems of recent vintage are not discussed, even though they would lead to a different direction, for example there is no discussion of the generation of Binyamin Shevili, Ella Bat Zion, or Rifka Miriam. This work rests in classic modernism. The work is also entirely a cognitive discussion, more would have been gained by looking at how contemporary religious poets look at the issues, for example through the important journal IMAGE:Art, Faith and Mystery.

In the 19th century, Prayer even without God changes a person declared Kierkegaard, prayer as a projection of the ego is the essence of religion decided Feuerbach. Sagi returns to find the pieces of modern Jewish thought on prayer that speak to this approach, such as Franz Rosenzweig’s – expressive and emotive prayer and Wiesel’s prayer at God instead of to God. Sagi manages to even glide Rav Nachman into considering prayer as the modernist action since “ Every blame of grass has a prayer”- so it is not expressive or faith but an action. Sagi finds that the common principle to modern prayer as self-expression and traditional prayer is their depth structure. He proves this by quoting rabbi S R Hirsch that the essence of prayer is self-judgment. So we prove tradition and modernity coincide by showing that a cultured 19th century Wiemar romantic rabbi just so happens to sound like early 20th century Hebrew poets.

Religious moderns used to ask about the efficacy of prayer, and they used to answer using shards of Albo that prayer is a self-fulfilling statement, personal transformation, and acceptance that God’s will be done. This is true whether they framed prayer as a gift from God or as a human obligation. Philosophy of relgion deal with the coherence of prayer in the modern age but for Sagi the real question is what model of prayer?

In conclusion, Sagi offers us an alternate model that “Prayer is not the inheritance of religion, on the contrary the religious ritual of prayer …is one of the expressions of human existence. We now have a modernist prayer without belief. Prayer is about fate, existence, and the questions of life. God’s death is a moment in our demythologized human narrative. Sagi has officially crossed the line into liberal theology reminiscent of Bultmann.

From my American perch, Sagi is attempting to create a minimal deity far from the theism that people cannot believe anymore, akin to discussions of prayer in Arthur Green and Elie Wiesel. Sagi can also be compared to the discussion in Adam Kirsch’s review Unorthodox Theology about “an anthology of liberal Jewish thought evinces a deep unease with traditional conceptions of God.” Kirsch continues his summary: “God, in these pages, is not a being to be described but a process to be experienced. As Kalmanofsky puts it, “Theology is discourse about God. Religion is the human, social response to transcendence; systems of ideas, tales, and behaviors that help us keep faith with our deepest spiritual experiences.”

The weak part of the presentation is that Sagi still does not understand the turn away from self in a post-Heidegger, Levinas, and Derrida world. Yet, he wants to be part of this post-modern discourse. Sagi wants desperately to offer a phenomenology based on Jean Luc Marion in which Sagi’s modernist prayer of self-expression and in which God does not appear is equated with the God beyond self, a Given, in the Marion sense. However, the given for Marion “is famous for the idea of what he calls the “saturated phenomenon,” which is inspired by his study of Christian Neoplatonic mystical theologians….[The idea that] there are phenomena of such overwhelming givenness or overflowing fulfillment that the intentional acts aimed at these phenomena are overrun, flooded—or saturated.” Sagi’s phenomena of prayer never overcomes the self or has a givenness of God that overruns our theological categories. Sagi should listen to Caputo’s classes or read Richard Kierney, in which God returns after God- a disorientation that we learn to welcome.

Depending how the book is edited, it may become a classic for Israeli high schools and an entrance for Americans into Hebrew poetry as a religious quest. The approach will definitely not excite the new generation of spirituality, meditation, and new age. It probably has drifted too far afield for use in the religious community. But it is still nice to have a humanistic approach to Jewish prayer, that should find many an eager reader. If there is time to still work on the manuscript, I would suggest a greater emphasis on questions than answers and a coda of some of the recent thinking about poetry and religion found in the journal IMAGE.

From IMAGE
Garcia Lorca once said, ‘we need four white walls and a silence where the poet’s voice can weep and sing.’ One enters that space with the hope that, through the making of language, the making of poems—poesis, after all, means making—one will be taken away, one will go where one hasn’t been before. We hope to be possessed.”

More recently, writing in Image #49, Robert Cording sounds a similar note. “Both poetry and prayer acknowledge the limits of the ego. In this sense, their origins are rooted in invocation—a calling out to that which cannot be seen or logically understood and which ultimately cannot be put into language.

OK- go read the review and come back to discuss.

Two views of Fackenheim and related approaches

I wanted a more critical approach to Fackenheim than found in the works of Michael Morgan so I turned to David Patterson, Emil Fackenheim Syracuse UP 2008. The book won the 2008 National Jewish Book Award in the category of Modern Jewish Thought, so I assumed it would be more critical.For Patterson, Fackenheim represents a Jewish thinker who affirms the centrality of Torah, yet does not despair of philosophy the way Levinas and Soloveitchik despair. Fackenheim has the tikkun for the darkness at the heart of man as told by Joseph Conrad or Primo Levi. The height of the book for me was when Patterson used the thought of the kabbalist Yitzhak Ginzburgh to explain Hannah Arendt, that too much ego leads to absolute evil.

A different approach is offered by Konstanty Gebert. An observant Polish Jew who was instrumental as an educator and journalist in Solidarity. He now edits Midrasz, a Polish-Jewish monthly.  Interview with him

He wrote an article “Forgetting Amalek” in Responsibility in Crisis, editor David William Cohen & Michael Kennedy 183-201

Gebert writes that the Torah teaches us to wipe out the memory of Amalek but to always remember their treachery – there is a tension of memory/oblivion

Emil Fackenheim offers the 614th commandment. For Gebert, that is like the situation described by Gregory Bateson, a double bind that produces pathological disassociation or a catch -22. If the Shoah makes one turn away from religion then the 614th commandment to not give Hitler a posthumous victory by turning away. It means that one is either not true to one’s self or is helping the holocaust. One cannot turn away and if one accepts the call of the Holocaust one disassociates from oneself.

He ponders if Amalek in the Torah, as pure evil, is a construct based on their trauma and not on actual knowledge of Amalakites.  Hating Amalek was an easy thing in their post traumatic stage and the inherited trauma of their immediate descendents.

But, the Babylonians mixed all the tribes in the area through forced relocations. This nullified the commandment to eliminate the Amalek, because at that point the Amalek ceased to exist as a tribe.

Gebert thinks that the university today has a responsibility to help prevent the creation of new Amalek images. We need to separate historic understanding from justifying. We need free debate and intellectual liberty.

Now Amalek’s children themselves need to condemn the evil and work together with the children of victims. We need to remember the evil of Amalek, but the only way to truly wipe out Amalek is through reconciliation. Children of Amalek will come to naught if not helped by the children of the victims.

As a comparison, Avi Sagi sought to justify the Biblical prohibition and explain the moral problem now that we have modern morals, many commentaries on Joshua and Samuel also resort to justification and limiting, but not to reconciliation or the role of the university.  The Punishment of Amalek in Jewish Tradition: Coping with the Moral Problem, Avi Sagi, Harvard Theological Review Vol.87, No.3 (1994)

Reb Shlomo and Reb Zalman taught that we have to turn to simcha to overcome the inner darkness. Then we have to return to Torah in a more open way. Reb Shlomo text.

In contrast, the Haredi world, based on a teshuvah of Rabbi Menashe Klein, overcomes the Holocaust by creating a saving remnant of true Jews. They focus only on the true Haredi Jews and limit the validity of conversions including Emil Fackenheim’s son.

Avi Sagi, Tradition vs. Traditionalism

More on Avi Sagi,  Tradition vs. Traditionalism

This book presents his take on his four favored thinkers: Leibowitz, Soloveitchik, Goldman, and Hartman. I am not sure how much I agree with any of these readings.

Sagi likes Soloveitchik as confessional, existential, communication, and sensitive to the human plight,it makes for good “thematic halakhah.” but notes that Soloveitchik is not really existentialist and is more Kierkegaard where the natural order is one of alienation serves to drive us to religion. But in Sagi’s harsh reading of Solovetichik, religion is the only true, useful, and acceptable vision of man, a limited relationship to the modern world. Hence a retreat from the modern world, or a least a very rigid hierarchy. Modern man is characterized by alienation, boredom, frustration, and Soloveitchik cannot see the positive in modern secular man.  In Sagi’s opinion, there is openness to the human plight but closure to modern values. (American readers may not be familiar with this Israeli reading)

Sagi likes Leibowitz for his ability to compartmentalize religion from the modern world. For Leibowitz even the fear and trembling associated with relgion, as in Kierkeguard, are not religious but part of ones secular psychology, personal struggles, and inner self. Only faith is faith. He likes the valuing of the Oral Torah over the written Torah, since the written torah is from God and we cannot know its true meaning, but we do know the Oral law since we create it. And our following it for its own sake is faith. No realization of divine ideal through halakhah as in Soloveitchik but pure lishmah, pure obedience. Modern formulation allows the tradition to be kept.

Sagi’s hero is Eliezer Goldman, (student of Soloveitchik, and trained in American jurisprudence turned kibbutznik and Maimonidean- In my time his articles had a cult following). Goldman distinguishes between illusory and non-illusory faith, illusory faith seeks to remake the world according to ones yearnings. In contrast, non-illusory faith accepts the world as it is and there is no escape from reality. There is no certainty of any traditional metaphysical claims. Faith allows one to accept God and revelation; revelation is not a datum of experience but part of the worldview after faith. Revelation is the recognition of the halakhic realm as heteronomous. Commandments have meaning and value but not reasons, causes or factual referents.

All halakhah is grounded in meta-halakhah as its meaning. (Rabbi Wurzburger and Prof Twersky took the concept from Goldman.) Goldman rejects the legal formalism of Kelsen and Hart and stresses instead the worldview of the jurists, the need for juridical autonomy, and values. Values and principles do not rest on facts.  (Today this is closest to what is taught under the broad category of Dworken followers, and has elements of Isaiah Berlin.)  The law needs to be realistic and adapt to changing situations. And just like Maimonides poured “Old wine in new bottles” by reading Torah through Aristotle, we are self- conscious in our need for a new formulation. Like Maimonides, he rejects the view of the hamon am, the ordinary believer, as not true faith. (Somehow Sagi calls this Dwroken-Berlin approach post-modern.)

Sagi presents Hartman as a modernist in that he is in dialogue with the tradition and questions it.  He quotes Hartman as saying that Jewish thinkers know their period or text, while Jewish philosophers also seek to dialogue the Jewish thought with the present and other cultures. For Hartman, Maimonides as hero of integration and synthesis. Hartman chooses to develop his thought from Halakhah and Hazal over the Bible because the Bible is too theocentric. Halakhah is better for an anthropocentric philosophy. Hartman offers a Torah of pluralism of human construction, answers to human needs, a rejection of the theocentric,  and a rejection of terms like “alienation” as vestiges of older European thought. Hartman offers a halakhic hope for the state of Israel and the messiah, which is this-worldly, conservative and realistic—unlike the utopia, apocalyptic and unrealistic hope of others.

As a side story, Sagi has a great chapter of the coming to be of Leibowitz’s compartmentalized view. It all started with a forgotten 1952 article by Ernst Simon “Are we still Jews?”  The article discussed the views of his friends and colleagues in the “Bahad”- German religious kibbutz movement. He wrote that they are all Catholic in that they want an all encompassing view of Torah. Simon argued that a Protestant approach would allow for recognizing the secular state, and offers freedom for religious Jews to restore a meaningful existence for ourselves. In the article, he discusses his friend, the Bnai Akiva leader Leibowitz  who thought that we need to change the halakhah radically for the new state  to be all encompassing. Simon compares him to a reverse of Neturei Karta who want everything as it was. Leibowitz changes his view to agree with Simon and goes further using dialectic theology. The state and all of life is secular except for religion itself, all religion is a personal decision. Leibowitz even renames his  1943 essay from “Educating toward a Torah State” to “Education towards Torah in a Modern Society.”Rabbi Moshe Zvei Neriah also responded in 1952 to Simon and wrote that the secular state is a problem to our religious vision. Therefore must give religious meaning to the state

Gadamer on Orthodoxy: Tradition as self-identity

Avi Sagi,  Tradition vs. Traditionalism (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2008) $69 short paperback!

The book deals with a pluralistic halakhic approach and was combined together in the Hebrew edition with the book that I discussed below.- here. In English, it is two separate books. I will comment on the book itself next week. However, the book has a short first chapter, newly written after the rest of the essays in the book, that approaches the question of pluralism from the perspective of Gadamer.

He asks: How can the modern Jew appropriate the tradition?

Sagi answers it using his new found readings in currently read books that are beyond his training in analytic philo and existentialism.

His basic answer is that now we can appropriate the tradition in an open ended way based on Gadamer, no more alienation from religion due to modernity or lack of freedom in halakhah. We just read it with open horizons.

I am not sure if he intends to be liberal or conservative and he certainly does not deal with questions of rabbinic and communal authority. It is an existential appropriation of the tradition. I am not sure what I gain here over Franz Rosenzweig.

On Tradition: He has a nice use of Zygmunt Bauman to show the paradox, in which once one speaks of a tradition then the speaker is no longer part of the tradition. Tradition lies in tacit acceptance without justification Bauman claims that the use of the concept tradition is more about the present and future than the past. Speaking of tradition is itself about renewal or the conscious identification with something and ascribing of new meaning. (As a side point, Bauman is essential for most topics these days- why is he taking so long to be integrated into American thought?)

Tradition has 4 parts according to John Thompson- hermeneutical, normative, legitimacy, and identity and all have been broken. (I am not so certain- most people have taken these upon themselves in his/her period of emergent adulthood. And in the post Evangelical age they have all returned.)

Sagi quotes Gadamer’s rejection of Schleiermacher approvingly that we cannot attain the original meaning, therefore it is personal appropriation as something new. Tradition is one of self identity through appropriating ones tradition as one’s own.

I don’t think Sagi gets the radical openness of Heidegger horizons (Compare Fishbane who does get Heidegger)nor the Ricoeur tensions of scholarship, personal, narrative, and revelation.)

Returning to his existentialist favorites, Sagi quotes Kierkegaard one can return on the personal level, to community and to one’s imagines inner home.  But, he writes that after Bauman and Gadamer- we don’t return to the actual past but stand in tradition.

He thinks that his approach overcomes the alienation that Peter Berger circa 1972 describes of having no return to the past after modernity. [Does Sagi know that by 1995 Berger rejected this sharp dichotomy and his students, like Christian Smith, are some of the leading researchers into Evangelicalism as a contemporary movement? What of Jose Casanova and Charles Taylor et al?]

Now that we have re-appropriated tradition, we can see that Traditions undergo change – even revolutionary ones.  [his proof is Halbertal on tannaic exegesis]. (Don’t I have this from the 1830’s already with Friedrich Carl von Savigny and Schleirmacher? Isn’t this just positive-historical without the philological certainty?

Sagi advocates a post-traditionalism in which tradition is dynamic and changes and is captured in dialogue. We enter into the tradition in dialogue with self, past, community, and a fusion of horizons. No return to the texts themselves. [He seems to conflate hermeneutics of retrieval of scholarship with hermeneutic of personal meaning]Modern Jews can return though a Gadamer tradition, which according to Sagi overcomes modern alienation, allows freedom, and creates choice—a Kierkegaardian freedom to recognize limits and given situation.

So bye bye Wittgenstein closed language- Hello Gadamer.

But wait, he concludes his essay with the question: Don’t religious and secular receive the tradition differently.  Are they even sharing the same tradition? Yes, there is a Wittgenstein family resemblance that holds it together. Therefore, we do nothave to worry about different horizons.

I must note that there are 6-7 of you out there that have been sending me  long comments and questions by email and not posting. If you want to discuss my rambling then post it.

A pluralist, demythologized and this-worldly halakhah

Jewish Religion after Theology by Avi Sagi Academic Studies Press 2009

Many of the works of Israeli thinkers of the last few decades are coming out in translation. Avi Sagi of Bar-Ilan and Shalom Hartman Institute seems to be collecting all his articles into books.

Sagi’s book is an attempt to use the answers to the questions of 1970’s to answer the questions of the 1990’s.If a generation ago we asked how can there be religion after analytic philosophy showed that there is no proof for God and the problems of science and evil for the religion, Sagi is now asking how can we create pluralism and liberalism from these same orthodox resources..

In short, he wants to use the thought of Yeshayahu Leibowitz, Eliezer Goldman, Joseph B. Soloveitchik, and David Hartman to create a this-worldly, pluralistic religion, without theology. In actuality, the book assumes the reader has read 2 or 3 works by Leibowitz already and the other thinkers are used to fill in gaps in Leibowitz.

He wants to expand Leibowitz’s Kantian certainties to now embrace the social, moral and intellectual pluralism of  the 1990’s, as defined by philosophers like John Kekes.

His answer is a form of treating halakhah as a fixed set of rules, a closed language similar to Wittgenstein. Personally, I have met many young rabbis who devote themselves to halakhah but have a smattering of philosophy, who take a similar Wittgenstein approach. Sagi works out many of the details.

He compares Leibowitz to the this-worldly approach of Camus, not to actually show parallels rather to show by theme and variations the possibility of using Leibowitz for a here-and-now religion.

The historical narratives are only needed as part of the rules of the game. As Leibowitz taught, Bible, Jewish History, and historical events are only important to the extent they play a role in halakhah. Translation of any religious term into external reality is a form of idolatry, directing one’s faith to an object instead of to God.

In fact, the whole purpose of faith for Leibowitz is to fight idolatry, against superstition, magical thinking, nationalism, and history. Our God is transcendent- any connection of the Jewish God to this world is seen as pagan or worse. Religion is to show obedience to the halakhah.

Sagi is most creative in moving Leibowitz from his Barthian treatments of halakhah as outside the natural order to a Rudolph Bultmann demytholization. Sagi is against the reification of Torah as myth and magic.

For Sagi, Goldman shows how to still work for bettering the world, Soloveitchik applies this to the question of theodicy, and Hartman to building a pluralistic society.

We have a pluralistic, demythologized, and this-worldly orthodoxy.

This work shows a side of Israeli Religious-Zionist thought as taught on Kibbutz Hadati or Bar Ilan that does not always get translated. Personally, it is not my cup of tea. I prefer high theology. But the book offers an American community a discussion of the role of belief, scientific truth, halakhah without theology, and pluralism that it currently lacks.

However, it assumes that one has basically found one’s answers in Leibowitz. On the more empirical note, to view Orthodoxy as a fight against magical thinking is a bit counter experience. In addition, there has been a turn to spirituality in these same institutions. Finally,  in a post Hermeneutic age – the abstractions of Kant, Camus, Barth, and Bultmann have given way to greater discussion of texts and culture. Since Sagi was recently made the chair of hermenutics and culture, we will see if his thought responds accordingly.