Category Archives: halakhic theory

Marc Shapiro interview- Renewing the Old, Sanctifying the New

For more than a century, many of the writings of Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook remained in manuscript, hidden away from the public eye.  The works of Rabbi Kook that were published in the interim had many passages removed from them. Only in the last quarter century have these original manuscript works been published. The Shemonah Kevatzim are the original notebooks that Rabbi David Cohen (the Nazir, d 1972) and Rabbi Zvi Yehuda (d. 1982) used to produce the standard editions of Rabbi Kook’s writings. In these notebooks, we see many passages that the editors left out of printed editions. And in Li-Nevukhei ha-Dor, we see a Rabbi Kook grappling with many of the religious issues of late nineteenth-century thought. These new works present to the reader a vista on a Rabbinic thinker struggling with many of the issues of fin de siècle modernity. In a recent book, Marc B. Shapiro presents choice quotes of these writings for an American Orthodox audience.  

Marc Shapiro’s new book is Renewing the Old, Sanctifying the New: The Unique Vision of Rav Kook (Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2024).  Marc B. Shapiro holds the Weinberg Chair in Judaic Studies at the University of Scranton, Pennsylvania. A graduate of Brandeis and Harvard universities, he is also the author of Between the Yeshiva World and Modern Orthodoxy: The Life and Works of Rabbi Jehiel Jacob Weinberg, 1884–1966 (1999); The Limits of Orthodox Theology: Maimonides’ Thirteen Principles Reappraised (2003); and Changing the Immutable: How Orthodox Judaism Rewrites Its History (2015), all published by the Littman Library. Shapiro produced many videos and podcasts about his work on Orthodox rabbis and their ideas; he is deeply appreciated by his audience.

In the book, Shapiro picks out many of Rabbi Kook’s major ideas that would be new to his audience including the challenges of modern science, treating the Bible in a non-literal way, the notion of natural morality as a counter to book law. his view of other religions, even acknowledging the possibility of alternate revelations, his idea of how a future Sanhedrin will update Jewish law, as well as his defense of Orthopraxy for those who cannot accept all the dogmas. Shapiro uses his vast knowledge of other Orthodox thinkers such as Chief Rabbi Yitzhak HaLevi Herzog (d. 1959) and Rabbi Yechiel Yaakov Weinberg (d.1966) to contextualizes Kook’s statements. The focus of the book is on topics of interest within English-speaking Orthodoxy (or of interest to Shapiro) and not on Kook’s use of Hegel and Schopenhauer, his views of history, or individualist views of creativity.  At many points, Shapiro contrasts Rabbi Kook to the limits within American Orthodoxy, or has personal asides where he directly speaks to American Orthodoxy. These ideas of Rabbi Kook from 100 years ago were influential in the formation of Religious Zionism, which developed sharply different from American forms of Orthodoxy.

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The ideas in the book have dozens of well-known interpretations in Religious Zionist thought, so the book would not be an innovation to them or their students. To take one example that I know well, Shapiro presents Kook’s ideas that the religions of the world are all part of the dew of the divine light and part of a Divine plan to uplift the world. Contemporary interfaith work, however, is already situated in a context where Rabbi Eliezer Melamed, Rabbi Oury Cherki, Rabbi Shlomo Amar, as well as my friend Rabbi Yakov Nagen, as well as many others, have been working for decades within Rabbi Kook’s framework to encounter other religions positively as part of a divine plan.

Another example: Shapiro cites that Rabbi Kook encouraged the study of Jewish thought, and only those trained in it should comment on Jewish thought. But Jewish thought is standard, in a Religious Zionist education consisting of at least the six thinkers of the Relgious Zionist canon Maimonides, Halevi, Maharal, Ramchal, Hayim of Volozhin, as well as mastery of Rabbi Kook’s writings. From there, one branches out to Midrash, Kabbalah, Hasidut, or even Franz Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption. If one visits a Religious Zionist bookstore such as Dabri Shir, the majority of books are of Jewish thought. Shapiro’s book works as a foil to American Orthodoxy’s omission and is not meant to comprehend the way these statements of Rabbi Kook about Jewish thought are presented and lived by the culture of Jewish thought as understood by Religious Zionist Rabbis such as Rabbis Melamed, Avinar, Ariel, Bin Nun, Shagar and Cherlow, each in a unique manner.

The pleasure of the book, for me, is in the details and notes. Lots of citations to interesting quotes from books and a wealth of parallel ideas to Rabbi Kook. I had forgotten that Rabbi Kook had a responsa about Bahai and I learned that Rabbi Zini, the editor of Eliyahu Benamozegh (d.1900), ironically rejects the universalism of Benamozegh and of Rabbi Kook. I do wish that the book had engaged with the proximal context of Rabbi Kook, including universalist thinkers such as Rabbi Shmuel Alexanrov, a fellow Volozhin graduate with whom Kook corresponded about Buddhism, who had more radical views about other religions.

In many ways, this book continues Prof Marc Shapiro’s lifelong interest in showing the limits of Orthodox theology. Shapiro shows that Kook’s thought is broader than American Orthodox thought and that many of Kook ‘s ideas have parallels in other Orthodox Jewish thinkers whom Shapiro has written about, thereby creating or advocating a broader spectrum of ideas. I recommend reading some of his other articles here for a fuller discussion. For many American Modern Orthodox and Yeshivish readers, the book will be eye opening. They are already familiar with and appreciate Shapiro’s wide-ranging presentations of historical figures with Orthodoxy. They will welcome the book. The book is a fun and easy read for those interested in the topic, and is worthy of a long summer Shabbat afternoon to enjoy the book.

1. Why did you write the book?

Starting with the publication of Rav Kook’s Shemonah Kevatzim, we have been fortunate to see the release of a series of new books from Rav Kook, including Li-Nevukhei ha-Dor, his modern-day Guide of the Perplexed (though he didn’t give it that title himself). These writings, some of which were suppressed, cover a range of topics that I find particularly fascinating, and which have not been the focus of much writing on Rav Kook. In these works, Rav Kook expands upon ideas he mentions only briefly elsewhere, such as his views on sacrifices and the role of the religious masses.

I wrote this book because I am deeply intrigued by his unconventional views, but also because I thought others, particularly those within the Modern Orthodox community, would find them of great interest. Many had only known him as the prophet of religious Zionism. I believe the book has struck a chord because already several people have told me how surprised they are at the breadth of ideas Rav Kook explored. His openness to other religions is one example, but there are many more. Rav Kook brought originality into nearly everything he discussed, so it is no surprise that his newer books contain such fresh and thought-provoking insights.

2)  You discuss evolution and the long evolutionary sense of a long history, including events long before the Bible, such as the Pleistocene age, but you mention that it is already accepted in Modern Orthodox High School textbooks. So, why do we need thinkers from 100 years ago to justify what is already accepted?

I don’t think it is a matter of needing thinkers from a century ago to justify anything. What I aimed to do is expose people to the perspectives of rabbinic leaders like Rav Kook and R. Herzog on these matters. That, in itself, has value, even if it doesn’t have any immediate practical implications. Furthermore, while it is true that Modern Orthodox high school history classes may accept that human civilization predates the traditional Jewish dating, I have seen very little reckoning with this from an Orthodox theological perspective.

How can one reconcile the biblical chronology of human development with the findings of modern scholarship, which show that humanity existed long before the timeline outlined in the Bible? At one time, the Modern Orthodox world devoted significant effort to reconciling an ancient universe with the book of Genesis. These efforts often focused on dinosaurs and fossils, and sought to show that creation could have occurred billions of years ago even though the Torah’s literal account places the world’s creation at less than 6,000 years ago.

Yet R. Herzog was not troubled by an ancient universe. His focus was on the next step: If humanity’s creation and expansion predate the Torah’s account, then the early chapters of the Torah must be understood in a non-literal fashion.

Rabbi Herzog hoped to write a book to define the boundaries of non-literal interpretation in the Torah. Unfortunately, he never had the chance to do so. Had he written this book, he would have needed to determine when the Torah shifts from “mythic history” to actual historical events. With his knowledge of history and science, he would have approached events like the Flood and the Tower of Babel differently than his predecessors in the traditional world. In his letters, which I published in the book, you can see how he struggled with the challenge of determining how far a non-literal interpretation could be extended, particularly as such an approach would break with the traditional views held by earlier commentators.

3) Why are you addressing American Centrist Orthodoxy with Rav Kook’s view when he is not the major influence on the community?

It is true that Rav Kook is not the dominant influence in the community, but he does hold a significant influence, and hopefully, that influence will continue to grow. As I mention in the book, I believe that many of Rav Kook’s insights which have nothing to do with Religious Zionism, on topics such as the appropriate curriculum, the place of halakhah, secular studies, literalism in Torah interpretation, heresy, halakhic change, natural morality, and other areas, will be of particular interest to the Modern Orthodox community. Yet the book is not only directed to them. Rav Kook’s ideas should be fascinating to all readers, regardless of their background or affiliation.

4) You seemingly paint Rav Kook as a modernist, yet we know he gave very anti-secular studies directives to his inner circle of students.

I would not describe Rav Kook as a modernist, especially given the associations that term carries. However, I would agree that he should also not be regarded as a traditionalist. It is true that Rav Kook spoke about the importance of secular studies, but we cannot ignore the fact that the yeshiva he founded did not include them in its curriculum. Moreover, most of his students did not engage with secular disciplines, and Rav Kook did not actively encourage them to do so. Even R. Zvi Yehudah, who had broad interests in his early life, ultimately embraced a “Torah-only” lifestyle.

A similar question arises when we consider Rav Kook’s stance on academic Jewish studies. He definitely valued these areas, as seen in a 1908 letter to Rabbi Isaac Jacob Reines, whose yeshiva included secular studies. In the letter, Rav Kook expressed his intention to establish a yeshiva that would include the study of “Hokhmat Yisrael” (Iggerot ha-Re’iyah, vol. 1, p. 148). In a letter to R. Isaac Halevy, author of Dorot ha-Rishonim, R. Kook reaffirms the necessity for new approaches in scholarship, arguing that the traditional approach will not be able to stand against the forces seeking to tear down tradition (Iggerot ha-Re’iyah, vol. 1, p. 188). Despite these sentiments, however, Hokhmat Yisrael was never incorporated into his yeshiva’s curriculum.

R. Ari Chwat has written two articles documenting Rav Kook’s positive attitude toward modern scholarship (Talelei Orot, vols. 13 and 14). Chwat explains that Rav Kook ultimately recognized that, at that moment in time, other priorities needed more emphasis, such as Jewish nationalism and the study of the Bible and “Emunah”. As a result, his dream of including an Orthodox Hokhmat Yisrael in the curriculum had to be postponed. I think a similar reasoning can be applied to secular studies. Rav Kook certainly appreciated them, but incorporating them into his yeshiva’s curriculum seemed too far a step for him. For those who were already inclined to these fields, he would be supportive, but not in the sense of making them part of the curriculum or encouraging students who had no such inclinations.

5) You mention that Rabbi Kook’s soul was aspiring to prophecy, Ruah Hakodesh and spirituality, and in his writings he preferred those over Talmud. Are you advocating those spiritual soul building forms of Torah?

I am not advocating for any forms of Torah that focus on spiritual soul-building experiences, but some are inclined in that direction. For example, the Nazir who was focused on the renewal of prophecy, perhaps seeing how Rav Kook sensed that he might have failed in this area could have been too much of a “downer” for those who wished to renew the prophetic spirit and saw Rav Kook as their guide in this matter. If there are Religious Zionist thinkers in Israel today who seriously imagine a resumption of prophecy, they intend this to come about through the study of Kabbalah. In this regard, they would be following the tradition of Rav Kook as carried on by the Nazir, rather than by Rav Zvi Yehudah, who was a more “this-worldly” figure.

 I would simply note that Rav Kook himself had doubts about whether his own inner spiritual experiences were genuinely from God or simply creations of his imagination. In a passage that the Nazir—who himself was striving for prophecy—censored, Rav Kook wrote: “I listen and I hear from the depths of my soul, from among the feelings of my heart, the voice of God calling. I experience a great trembling; have I so descended to become a false prophet, to say God sent me when the word of God has not been revealed to me.” I find Rav Kook’s honesty in this passage very refreshing, as it reveals his own self-doubts.

6) Where is Rabbi Hertzog the same or different than Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook?

R. Isaac Herzog, who succeeded Rav Kook as the Ashkenazic Chief Rabbi of Eretz Yisrael, was quite different from Rav Kook. Unlike Rav Kook, he had a deep secular education, was fluent in many languages—both ancient and modern—and was fully at home in academic Jewish studies. His works primarily focused on talmudic studies and Jewish law, mostly from a traditional perspective, but he also produced academic works. Unlike Rav Kook, Kabbalah was not a central feature of R. Herzog’s life.

Rav Kook, as we know, was very much a mystic whose thoughts and his thoughts spanned the spectrum of ideas. While he also wrote on Talmud and halakhah, he did not view this as his primary contribution. Rav Kook had no formal academic training and did not produce works that could be categorized as academic. When faced with a conflict between science and Torah, Rav Kook looked at scientific conclusions—based on his understanding—and sought to harmonize them with Torah. R. Herzog, on the other hand, was deeply engaged with understanding how historians and scientists arrived at their conclusions. He carefully examined historical and scientific texts and reached out to leading non-Jewish scholars to hear their perspectives.

7) You discuss the Bible as not literal. Can you explain?

 I try to place Rav Kook’s perspective within a larger context by examining how other figures have addressed the apparent conflicts between Torah and science or history. Given that Rav Kook’s approach may seem unconventional to many, I felt it was important to show how others have approached these issues, including medieval Maimonideans. Years ago, I discovered a number of letters from R. Herzog on this very topic, and the book provided an opportunity to explore how he addressed the issue.

R. Herzog’s primary concern was the biblical chronology. Modern science and history suggest that humanity has existed for a much longer period than the biblical account would indicate. R. Herzog’s first step was to determine whether there is any doubt regarding the modern scientific and historical conclusions. If there are any doubts, the biblical narrative can be understood literally. However, if there is no doubt about the scientific conclusions regarding the timeline of human history, he believed there is no choice but to interpret the Torah’s account in a non-literal way.

8) You seem to advocating both Orthopraxy and Social Orthodoxy. You seem to use Rabbi Kook to advocate for  Modern Orthodox who are lax in mizvot and non-believers because they send their kids to day schools and give to Jewish causes.

I am not advocating for Orthopraxy or Social Orthodoxy. What I highlight are important statements from Rav Kook in which he demonstrated an openness both to non-observant Jews and to observant Jews who did not subscribe to traditional Orthodox dogmas. While Rav Kook did not support either of these approaches, he saw ways in which these individuals could still be included within the community. What we today call Orthopraxy fits squarely within the framework Rav Kook mentions, namely, that those with heretical beliefs, as long as those beliefs do not have an impact in the real world, should not be regarded as heretics.

When it comes to non-observant Jews, an important distinction should be made. Rav Kook did not embrace all Jews simply because they were Jewish, which contrasts with the approach commonly found in today’s kiruv organizations. When Rabbi Jacob David Wilovsky challenged Rav Kook on his relationships with the irreligious—after all, there are the explicit halakhot about how to treat them—Rav Kook explained that there is a difference between those who are irreligious yet possess what he referred to as the segulah, and those who lack it. In a formulation that distances him from the Chabad approach, Rav Kook wrote, “I do not befriend all transgressors, but only those whom I feel have a great power of segulah within them” (Iggerot, vol. 2, p. 188).

Today, especially after October 7, we can clearly see that there are many irreligious Jews who have the segulah that Rav Kook spoke about. They take pride in their Jewish identity and are connected to the Jewish people and the State of Israel in various ways. These are the very people Rav Kook was referring to. We need not limit his words to the early pioneers, who were driven by an ethical vision and were willing to sacrifice so much for the Jewish people and the Land of Israel. Even more ordinary, “run-of-the-mill” Jews—such as those in bourgeois America—can be included in Rav Kook’s category of those who possess the segulah.

9) At the very end of your book, you point out that Rav Kook was against giving women the right to vote. But we have given women the right to vote. Therefore, we cannot accept everything he said. How do you determine what to take?

With every great thinker one will find teachings that are enduring and others that are transitory. When it comes to determining which parts of the Torah should be interpreted literally and which should not, Rav Kook acknowledges that there are no clear-cut markers, and that the intuitive sense of the Jewish people will ultimately provide the answer. I believe we must adopt the same approach when evaluating Rav Kook’s own teachings.

To return to the example you mentioned, while communal sentiments can shift, it is hard to imagine ever going back to an era in which the denial of women’s suffrage, as advocated by Rav Kook, is considered “the Jewish” approach. In this regard, as in many others, it is often the people’s intuitive sense that leads the way, and later rabbinic decisions simply give their imprimatur to the collective feelings of the community.

10) You write that you heard a shiur by a Centrist rabbi on the topic of “lo tehonem” (not to give a gentile a present or a compliment). You say that we have to let it drop. How do we determine what to drop since there are lots of things that are not modern values?

The issue here is not that we have to “let it drop.” It had already been dropped, and halakhic justification had been offered in justification of this. What we are facing today is an attempt to revive it, so to speak. Normally, when reviving a forgotten practice, the main concern is whether the community is prepared to adopt a greater stringency. However, in this case, the “stringency” challenges our ability to live a normal life within a modern democratic society. R. Jehiel Jacob Weinberg already wrote about the need to declare this type of halakhah no longer relevant. In a letter to Samuel Atlas, after mentioning some discriminatory laws, R. Weinberg wrote: “We must solemnly and formally declare that in our day, this does not apply. Meiri wrote this, but the teachers and rabbis whisper to their students that all of this was written because of the censor.”

11) Rav Kook speaks of the evolution of animals to higher states. What does that mean?

I see myself in the rationalist camp, and the idea that animals will evolve to a higher state of consciousness is something that is difficult for anyone with a rationalist perspective to accept. While Rav Kook certainly draws on Maimonides’ Guide for the Perplexed, we often see that his ideas diverge from those of Maimonides in significant ways.

However, even if one cannot accept Rav Kook’s perspective on this issue, we must understand it as part of his broader vision of the world evolving toward greater perfection. It is also worth noting that his suggestion that animals will advance to a higher level helps explain why he that believes consuming animals will eventually become impossible. We kill animals to eat but if they advance to a higher level then they will no longer be “animals” as we now know them. Similarly, in such a world, animal sacrifices would no longer be applicable. The animals would no longer be the same creatures that were originally commanded to be sacrificed, so the Torah’s commandments regarding sacrifices would no longer apply.

12) You seem to write about two forms of natural morality. Can you explain?

Rav Kook speaks of trusting the natural instincts of the religious masses, and of natural morality as an inner sense that should remain uncorrupted. These are simply two expressions of the same phenomenon. Rav Kook believes that natural morality reflects divine values because the soul itself is implanted by the divine. As such, its intuitive feelings arise from this divine source and should be seen as pure, rather than as sentiments to be dismissed.

Rav Kook even describes these inherent natural feelings as characterizing the Patriarchs, who lived in a pre-Torah era and were thus forced to strive for perfection without the guidance of the written Torah.

Rav Kook’s perspective on natural morality, especially as it pertains to the masses, is particularly refreshing. In yeshivot we are taught that in matters of Torah, all valuable knowledge flows from the rabbis to the people; it is a one-way street. Rav Kook, however, turns this into a two-way street, where the masses also have something significant to offer to Torah scholars. While in the Haredi world, the idea of Daas Torah is often contrasted with Daas Baalei Batim, Rav Kook sees the religious masses as preserving Torah truths that sometimes elude the Torah scholars. This leads to a more inclusive vision of Judaism, in which a broader segment of the population can contribute in meaningful ways.

13) How would you answer those who critique your position on studying Jewish thought by saying that only halakhic authorities should decide such issues?

Rav Kook identified a significant problem: There are individuals who possess great halakhic knowledge but lack a deep understanding of Jewish thought. As a result, these individuals tend to adopt a “stringent” stance on matters of Jewish belief. They assume that everything they believe is a principle of the Torah, and if anyone expresses a differing opinion, they regard that person as a heretic. Therefore, even if one argues that halakhic authorities should be the ones to decide such matters, it is crucial that they also be well-versed in Jewish thought—a combination that has historically been quite rare.

In general, however, I do not accept the premise that halakhic authorities can “poskin” on matters of Jewish thought the way they decide questions of kashrut or Shabbat. I also do not believe that a view “accepted” years ago can now be ruled out of bounds. While some more recent Orthodox authorities adopt this position, Maimonides rejected such a conception, and I believe it lacks logical sense. I discuss this issue in my article, “Is There a ‘Pesak’ for Jewish Thought?” available here.

Rabbi Eliezer Melamed on Hinduism

The Israeli rabbinic world has finally begun to take account of the religions of the world, especially Hinduism and Buddhism, and has recently declared that they have the same status as Christianity.  

      Rabbi Eliezer Melamed, of Yeshivat Har Beracha, who is considered one of the leading halakhic authorities of the Religious Zionist world,d has recently issued a new volume of his comprehensive presentation of Jewish law entitled Emunah veMitzvotav (Faith and its Commandments), (Har Berakhah, 2025). In the new volume, Melamed presents a Jewish legal view of other religions, specifically Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism. To write these chapters, he consulted with several outside experts who were knowledgeable about both halakha and other religions (including myself).  I will discuss these views of Hinduism in this blog post and will deal with his approach to Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam in later blog posts. I will also cite the English summaries on the Yeshiva’s website so everyone can follow, even though I have the Hebrew original.

      The bottom-line conclusion is the Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism have been declared by Rabbi Melamed as forms of the halakhic category of shituf (associating something else with God), a category formulated because some Medieval Ashkenaz legal authorities who in their perception saw that Christian had the same Biblical God as Judaism but associated God with something else, Jesus.  The innovation in this book about Asian religions is that he treats the statues and images in Hinduism and Buddhism in the same manner as Christianity. He is decisive that for non-Jew,s “according to most halakhic authorities, there is no prohibition against practicing idolatry b’shituf. Therefore, as long as the idol worshiper also directs his worship to the one God above all the gods, he does not violate any prohibition.”

      Melamed naturally holds that this form of worship through images, intermediaries, and statues, where offerings are made and incense burned, is forbidden to Jews.  For him, the second commandment not to have images is addressed to Jews only because they have a special status. Non-Jews can have images, statues, and intermediaries (See Nahmanides Ex 20: 3).

      Many of us have been explaining for years that Hinduism today is not worshipping many gods. This was decaled in the Jewish- Hindu Rabbinic summits in 2007-2009, which was signed by the Chief rabbi and various rabbinic figures, but they have never been translated into Hebrew. He acknowledges that contemporary “Hinduism believes in a supreme source for all the gods.” This is a new start for a halakhic understanding of Asian religions, to treat them as believer in one supreme being. On some level already twenty five years ago, Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz was stating that Hinduism and Buddhism are monotheistic enough for halakhah.

      Even more importantly, Rabbi Melamed shows a great appreciation for the gifts of Hinduism, including meditation, religious pluralism, imagination, arts, personal expression, beauty, and sensitivity to all living beings.

It is important to note that the immense richness in Hinduism… the important place given to meditation that enables deep inner listening, has created an especially pluralistic position toward different religions and rituals…  From the wealth of thought and imagination about man and his soul, they can offer humanity an abundance of personal expression, and ways of dealing with the challenges of existence. Thus, the pluralism within Hinduism will coalesce into a movement toward the correction of the world and will not dissipate, wasting precious energy in vain. The rich and magnificent art that developed in India in literature, poetry, painting, sculpture, architecture, music, and more, will inspire people from all nations to add beauty and pleasure to the world. They will also be able to provide the world with the special sensitivity they developed toward all living creatures and plants, based on respect for all beings, and a desire not to harm them. The more they adhere to belief in one God and morality, the more they will channel this sensitivity toward the overall movement of correcting and redeeming the world.

This is an impressive acknowledgment from a halakhic rabbi, and he placed this statement in the middle of his legal discussion. This will be the mainstream position of his followers for decades to come.

      On the other hand, Melamed needlessly includes an essentialist reading of Hinduism from Christian sources explaining how they used to be demonic, worship idols, and of low morals. He reproduces the classic early 20th century Christian reading of world religions where each one is to found defective.  In this reading, Hindus are polytheists (a Protestant word) and demonic because 1 Corinthians 10: 20 affirms that Gentiles do sacrifices to demons and not to God. Following this line of thinking, he credits Hinduism with offering to demons. Yet, official forms of Hinduism since antiquity did not consider appeasement of various malicious spirits- Asuras and Rakshasas- as official Hinduism or as demonic. At best, they were forest spirits to be appeased when entering their realms. In contrast, Judaism has a large number of shedim, mazikim, ruhim, and lilin. The Talmud is filled with discussions of these beings and how to avoid, appease them, or even see them. We have many magical bowls and magical formula from the Rabbinic world. (see here in my interview with Prof Harari) The scapegoat ritual, as presented by Nahmanides, was to appease the demonic evil side, a clear act of demonic worship. Some have a custom at circumcision to place food for the spirits, and there are lots of Jewish customs of spilling water or wine to appease the spirits.

      In a similar manner, he condemns Hinduism for its former human sacrifice. But this practice is uncertain and may, or may not, have ever existed in the Bronze Age. Or it may have been done by marginal cults or non-Hindus. Yet, the Bible is explicit that Abraham thought he was to sacrifice his son, Jephthah sacrificed his daughter (Judges 11), there was the cult of Moloch, and King Ahaz sacrificed his son (2 Kings 16:3) and so did King Manasseh (2 Chronicles 33:6). If these Biblical stories are not normative, then the Hindu examples are equally not normative except through the colonial Christian gaze.

      Imagine if a Hindu would present Judaism as superstitious compared to modern Hinduism and trace how Judaism evolved from human sacrifice to a religion still inferior to Hinduism. This was the actual way that the Hindu Neo-Vedanta modernists such as Swami Dayananda, Swami Vivekananda, and the Scholar Surendranath Dasgupta saw Judaism as primitive compared to Hinduism and that Judaism is blind to its own idolatry and human sacrifice. (I dealt with it here and in my book).  They said this a full century ago, based on Christian anti-Judaism, we should not be hearing these things today. Jews do not see the Bronze Age idolatry of the Bible as in continuity with Rabbinic Judaism (circa 200 BCE to 200 CE), even if we claim cultural continuity. Hindus do not shy away from acknowledging that the Indus Valley Bronze age culture had primitive elements, even if they are not in continuity with the Upanishads religion (circa 200 BCE-200 CE)

      Rabbi Melamed also thinks the advancement of Hinduism in the modern era was due to the encounter with the ideas of Biblical Judaism as mediated by Christianity and Islam, which allowed them to find the best in their own tradition. “When it encountered fundamental ideas like those in the teachings of Judaism, about belief in one God and the moral imperative to correct man and society, it was able to give them a central place, as they resonated with deep currents that had existed within it for ages… Hinduism survived with vitality, as it has the ability to absorb lofty ideas, and progress through them.” Melamed is explicitly following the evolutionary thought of Rabbi Kook who wrote: “In every religion, there is a divine spark of morality that sustains it, through which it sets standards of good and evil. Thus, humanity can gradually advance towards the belief in divine unity and its moral teachings (‘Le’Nevuchei Ha’Dor’, Chapters 8; 14:1).” But Melamed adds that the “encounter with monotheism” from “the values of the Bible, whether consciously or unconsciously, became fundamental values in Hindu culture, based on which modern Indian society tries to build itself in the areas of governance, law, education, science, and economics.” He does not realize that in most of these fields, the Indian civilization was already advanced in antiquity; he has a British colonialist gaze.  We should note that the same Hindu modernists of a century ago ascribed the rise of the Biblical Abraham as based on the more advanced Hindu culture of the Vedas. And that many Modern Hindu thinkers of the early 20th century, including Swami Sivananda, the modernist teacher of Yoga, wrote that Judaism is derived from Zoroastrianism which itself is a corruption of the Vedic religion. Hence, the Abrahamic religions are Vedic at their core.

      To his credit, Rabbi Melamed accepted the ancient Upanishads quote proving Hindu theism from the Rabbinic author, Rabbi Yissachar Hyman, who wrote a Hebrew book called Judaism and Hinduism.

A student asks the sage: “How many gods are there?” The sage replies: “Three thousand three hundred and thirty-three.” The student says: “Yes, of course, but how many gods are there really?” The sage replies: “Thirty-three.” The student says: “Yes, of course, but how many gods are there really?” The sage replies: “Three.” The student says: “Yes, of course, but how many gods are there really?” The sage replies: “One and a half.” The student says: “Yes, of course, but how many gods are there really?” The sage replies: “One.”

It is an important quote for him to acknowledge that Hinduism did not just discover a single supreme being in the modern era. But Rabbi Melamed then has nothing to connect it with hisotriclaly or conceptually, hence he treats it as a hidden idea needing to be revealed in modernity through Biblical influence. However, the idea of one Supreme Being is in the Bhagavad Gita (~200 CE) and in the years 700-1000 CE, all the major religious commentaries and philosophers, including Sankara, Ramanuja, and Madhva, each taught a single divine being. It is like skipping in your understanding of Judaism from the Bible to modernity, thereby bypassing the Talmud and Maimonides.

      Nineteenth-century Europeans used to write that Jews had no ethics, certainly not compared to Christianity, and the Europeans did not think that Hindus had ethics either. Rabbi Melamed reproduces this Western critique of Hinduism ,not realizing that the same books said Judaism had little ethics. He does not seem to know about the extensive Hindu systems of ethics, hospitality, responsibility, duty, and of repentance,

      The need to bring up the caste system in ancient Hinduism was unnecessary and served no halakhic purpose or any purpose in contemporary discussions. It would be like a book on Judaism, starting with various difficult Biblical texts about marrying off a minor daughter or a discussion of contemporary Judaism, starting with Jews are divided into 12 tribes and the Levites don’t own land.

      In sum, Rav Melamed, because of his acceptance and stature has changed the discussion n Hinduism. His treating Hinduism as shituf and acknowledging the gifts of Indian culture is a huge advancement. It is certainly better than the Rabbis who declare anything from Hindu culture as forbidden or declare that it has an impure spirit hovering over it, or who use Wikipedia drivel to declare everything polytheistic. Rav Melamed is even better than those who use Joseph Campbell’s (or Heinrich Zimmer’s) universal vision of the ancient Aryans as polytheistic heroes, which has little to do with the actual Hindu religion. And we have certainly moved beyond the 2006 sheitel hair controversy, where the Rabbi just asked how it compares to the Mercury worship mentioned in the Talmud. (For more, see here).

      The article on the Yeshivat Har Beracha website includes a picture of a lined-up row of Ganesha statues waiting to be bought for use in worship. I am not sure that I would include such a picture of deities. Yeshivat Har Beracha would certainly not post a picture of a crucifix or even of a nativity scene. The fact that they posted a picture of a row of Ganesha statues indicates that the process of acceptance and integration of Hinduism is far from over. (Update: In response to my blog post, they changed the picture to someone meditating.)

Justice Stevens and the Jews

If you want a good topic to discuss this week, the legal decisions of retiring Justice Stevens would make for good conversation. He was narrow on free exercise when at the expense of something else and liberal on free speech. He has many angles that would make good Jewish conversation. I expect an op-ed from someone in Jewish paper in the next few weeks.

Stevens wrote against allowing a yarmulke in the Air Force, and was against the Kiryas Yoel redrawn religious district. He was against school vouchers and anything that would lead to religious indoctrination. Yet he allowed preaching and outreach in public place and full freedom for Santeria. He is against crèches in town squares and a few years ago Noah Feldman took him to task in the NYT’s for this.

Justice Stevens religion clause jurisprudence is reviewed in the following articles: Eduardo M. Penalever, Treating Religion as Speech: The Religion Clause Jurisprudence of Justice Stevens (SSRN, November 2005); Christopher L. Eisgruber, Justice Stevens, Religious Freedom, and the Value of Equal Membership, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 2177 (2006);

Ht/Religious Clause

But regardless of Stevens views, we should be appreciative living in a country with an establishment clause, freedom of religion and freedom of speech. More importantly, we should not abuse it. In the last few years, I have seen and heard arguments that run like this: Our preschool should not have to meet OSHA guidelines or health department rules because that would take away our ability to learn Torah. There is a sense that if we have religious freedom then that means we don’t have to follow other laws. I have also seen these arguments quoted in the papers to defend the various Jewish criminals of the last three years.

From our own perspective, have we created an appreciation for freedom of speech, freedom of religion, or freedom of religious conscious in our Judaism? Are these valuable rights only to receive and not to give? Can Judaism formulate anything close to modern views on these topics? Rav Herzog somewhat tried to create such an approach in Israel based on the need to follow world opinion and the dictates of the UN. Recent poskim, however, have rescinded Rav Herzog’s attempts. Now what? What about here in America?

From another angle, Justice Stevens is being called the last of the non ideological justices. Now everything is ideological. In the late 1950’s, there was even an essay on the end of ideology.
Would Rav Moshe Feinstein be the last of the non ideological poskim? Are all sides now ideological? (Let’s acknowledge that the sanctimonious on all sides, would see their leaders as non-ideological. But that is not an argument. ) Are we at a point of change, unlike the 1950’s, where are all halakhic positions are ideological?

Copyright © 2010 Alan Brill • All Rights Reserved

‘Sephardic’ Halakhah? The Attitude of Sephardic Decisors to Women’s Torah Study

Here is a nice article summarizing the state of the field on the relationship of Sephardic Jewish Law and modernity. It is one of those article that one can read and then pretend to know what one is talking about. Fuchs summarizes those who see the Sefardi world as more lenient and the critics of the position. He presents the work of both Binyamin Brown and Zvi Zohar. Bibliographies are also given for the state of Rav Ovadiah Yosef studies and the attitude of sephardi poskim toward women. It has the liberal Rav Mesas and the the stricter Rab Batzri.

The article is from the legal perspective but we still lack a good article from the historical perspective. We successfully situate the challenges of German poskim in German history of the enlightenment, this topic needs a similar approach. From the 1880’s until the 1950’s the Islamic modernists were in the forefront creating many very liberal fatwa, especially in Egypt. Then there was a return to more conservative opinions and women started wearing the chador again. Egypt was a center of modernism, other countries less so. When Rav Ohana was alive and when Rav Ovadiah started it was the era of modernism. Yet, the latter disliked the laxity of the Jewish modernists in Egypt but was very liberal with the North African development town Jews in Israel. The article does not deal with Israeli sociology.


‘Sephardic’ Halakhah? The Attitude of Sephardic Decisors to Women’s Torah Study: A Test Case

Ilan Fuchs
Tulane University, Jewish Studies Program December 31, 2009
Bar Ilan Univ. Pub Law Working Paper No. 02-10

Abstract:
This paper examines Sephardic rabbinic attitudes to women’s religious studies, and more specifically, advanced Talmud study. I draw on Halakhic texts written in the second half of the 20th century by leading Sephardic rabbis that immigrated to Israel. I first examine the terms Mizraxi and Sephardic and explain on what grounds I find reason to compare the rabbis discussed. I argue that there is no monolithic Sephardic halakhic tradition and that the rabbis discussed hail from diverse communities that experienced and reacted to western and secular influences in unique ways. I then describe how these rabbis reacted to changes in women’s religious and secular education, changes they were forced to confront as their communities were exposed to changing values and social realities. Examining how Sephardic rabbis have responded to the challenge of women’s Torah study allows us to test the claim that the Sephardic halakhic tradition is more flexible and tolerant of change than the Ashkenazi orthodox halakhic tradition.

ht/Religious Clause

One could compare some of these tensions to the fatwa of Muhammad Sayyid Tantawy, the recently deceased head of Al-Azhar University and grand Imam of the al-Azhar Mosque in Egypt. He was against female Imams and mixed events. Yet, he issued a fatwa allowing Muslim girls in France to take off their headscarves while attending school.
In October 2009, Tantawy launched a campaign against the Niqāb (the full-face veil which covers the entire body except for the eyes, increasingly worn by women in Egypt) by personally removing the Niqāb of a teenage girl (after she failed to remove it) at a secondary school affiliated to Al-Azhar University, He had asked the teenage girl to remove her veil saying: “The Niqāb is a tradition, it has no connection with law” He then instructed the girl never to wear the Niqāb again and promised to issue a fatwa against its use in schools. He then told the girl “So if you were even a little beautiful, what would you have done then?”

Copyright © 2010 Alan Brill • All Rights Reserved

The Radicalism of Legal Positivism [in Halakhah]

Now that everyone is running from Legal positivism into all forms of situational thinking, Brian Leiter reminds us why legal positivism seemed so radical at the time. It undid all the Hegelian need for situational organic thinking, it undid social realism, and it undid moralism. The law is the law. The law has no external sources and there are no external implications. Now, legal positivism seem stolid and unresponsive. Along the way the anti-liberal Leiter gets in his critique of critical legal studies as not realizing that they were returning to Hegel.

Once upon a time Brisker inspired positivist approaches to halkahah seemed radical, now people are returning to values, [imagined] community, social realism. This article give some of the framework for the comments on the ideal versus real debate in halakhah and why the positivism once seemed attractive.

The Radicalism of Legal Positivism
Brian Leiter, University of Chicago Law School
Guild Practitioner (forthcoming 2010)

Abstract:
“Legal positivism” is often caricatured by its jurisprudential opponents, as well as by lawyers and legal scholars not immediately interested in jurisprudential inquiry. “Positivist” too often functions now as an “epithet” in legal discourse, equated (wrongly) with “formalism,” the view that judges must apply the law “as written,” regardless of the consequences. Lon Fuller, Ronald Dworkin, and the Critical Legal Studies writers have all contributed in different ways to the sense that “positivism” is either a political conservative or politically sterile position. This essay revisits the actual theory of law developed by positivist philosophers like Bentham, Hart, and Raz, emphasizing why it is, and was, understood by its proponents, to be a radical theory of law, one unfriendly to the status quo and anyone, judge or citizen, who thinks obedience to the law is paramount. To be clear, the leading theorists of legal positivism thought the theory gave the correct account of the nature of law as a social institution; they did not endorse it because of the political conclusions it entailed, and which they supported. Yet these theorists realized that the correct account of the nature of law had radical implications for conventional wisdom about law. We would do well to recapture their wisdom today.
(The ful article has much more than the abstract)
Full article is available here

On the same trajectory of legal positivism and sittlichkeit

I finally got around to reading –Lawrence Kaplan, From Cooperation to Conflict: Rabbi Professor Emanuel Rackman, Rav Joseph B. Soloveitchik, and the Evolution of American Modern Orthodoxy Modern Judaism Volume 30, Number 1, February 2010. The article was good for clearing up the retrograding of the 1970’s tensions back onto the 1950’s when Rackman was indeed an official spokesman for Rav Soloveithchik. I thank the author for the generous shout out in the footnotes.

In that spirit, I must add to the article and move it more to legal theory. Rackman as a lawyer and political science professor was influenced by Chief Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Cordozo, by the emergent world of Mishpat Ivri and the rulings of the Warren court. Rav Soloveitchik thought about the rules of science and philosophy, Rabbi Rackman thought about a telos approach using legal categories. The emergent Conservative movement spoke historical approach to law of von Savigny, John Salmond, and economic judicial activism. It is worth considering that some of the YU “young poskim” with JD’s may have more philosophically in common with Rabbi Rackman that with Rabbi Soloveitchik.

Why would Rackman switch to Judaism? Milton Konvitz was one of the three editors and was encouraging Jewish Legal thinking and Jewish Human rights thinking. (And Konvitz was a fan of both Leo Jung and Jacob Agus)- see his Nine American Jewish Thinkers.

The article by Brian Leiter will offer some terms for understanding the Rackman-Soloveitchik positions and return of sittlichkeit in our time.

Copyright © 2010 Alan Brill • All Rights Reserved

Habermas and Halakhah -Guest post from AS

[My intended posts for this week are still on an external hard-drive, but I was lucky enough to have a guest post from AS]

AS writes in a comment:

Right now I can only offer the following brief comment that overly compresses what could be at least a book chapter. Those not familiar with Habermas should note that he talks about communicative rationality as an aspect of modernity. Therefore this constitutes a consciously external and modern critique of halakhah – although one that perhaps reveals the paradoxes in modern apologetics.

Before starting we need to ask how to characterize halakhic claims. More specifically we must ask where the binding normative force of halakhic claims come from. Sociology could adequately describe a community in which a certain species of claims were taken to be binding, along with the varieties of social coercion that are employed to ensure compliance, but this would not but this would not account for internal rules of justification that are capable of shaping beliefs.

One obviously wrong answer is to assume that halakhic claims aspire to truth, and that the truth conditions are correspondence to the revealed will of God. The binding force of halakhah in both ritual and moral domains derives solely from the authority of a just God.

This is the wrong picture for a few reasons, mostly because halakhah is “not in heaven.” The correctness of a halakhah derives not from its correspondence with a revealed word, but at least in part because it comes to be regarded as the correct interpretation of a text by means of a rational, internally consistent, discourse. The metatheory of halakhah, were it ever to be carefully explained, would not need to make any reference to God whatsoever in describing how halakhah functions to determine its correctness. At best there is some God-granted authority to interpret at the very root, but within the discourse this authority is neither appealed to or contested (except rhetorically), so it is moot.

Halakhah can therefore be construed as a species of rational communicative discourse. Indeed, in its internal dialectics it seems to aspire to be a rational discourse in that it follows rules of interpretation, precedent, etc. that are universally recognizable by all participants. If this is the case then a Habermasian would likely say that halakhic claims, like moral claims, aspire not to truth (having conditions of rightness constituted independent of the halakhic community) but rather to validity.

In general Habermas thinks that normative validity claims implicitly contains not merely the intersubjective ought, but to the universal/deontological. The deontological nature and binding force of normative claims stems from the idea the very participation in a discursive practice presupposes the acceptance of certain normative principles. In other words, we could not exist as a community of language-users capable of achieving basic communicative rationality (like coordinating behavior) without background normative assumptions which everyone implicitly relies upon in any discursive practice.

Now clearly halakhic claims cannot be “redeemed” in the same way that Habermas thinks that regular normative claims can – nor would we expect as much. We would liken halakhic discourse in many ways to legal discourse. But Habermas claims (and here it is simply easier to quote) that:

“Discourse theory explains the legitimacy of law by means of procedures and communicative presuppositions that, once they are legally institutionalized, ground the supposition that the process of making and applying the law lead to rational outcomes.” This rationality is proved not by the outcomes themselves, but procedurally “by the fact that addressees are treated as free and equal members of an association of legal subjects.”

Because halakhah is an exclusionary discourse that does not even aspire to procedural equality
, because addressees are not treated as equal, and because this inequality, instead of bearing a very high burden of rational justification is claimed to lie in a revealed metaphysical ontology, its claim to communicative rationality breaks down.

Halakhic discourse does not devolve into literal incoherence, and anyone familiar with legal discourse will not find it entirely foreign. But this is precisely because rabbis address each other, and sometimes learned laypersons, as equals (it by no means breaks from communicative rationality simply by appeal to various metaphysical processes or the like). On Habermasian grounds it breaks from communicative rationality when it treats its subjects unequally who themselves have no part in shaping the discourse.

At this point halakhah either makes a sharp premodern return to a mythical worldview, or remains modern but employs an instrumental rationality in its treatment of some of its subjects (I don’t think it’s quite strategic rationality because it lacks the pretense of equal participation). I think that both of these are in play. Sometimes in contemporary halakhah difference and exclusion are justified naturalistically (in a sense because some subjects do not transcend nature, they are regarded as a part of the natural world to be intervened upon) and sometimes by appeal to a premodern mythology. And sometimes it is a rather interesting hybrid. [end of AS guest post]

For those who are less familiar with Habermas, I [AB] add some links and definitions. Basic wiki biography , communicative action, and the public sphere, as well as the SEP on Habermas. Even from the links and the short definitions below, it may be enough to have some serious discussion. For those, who need a translation, a deontological claim, in this context, means something is assur or muttar.

From Wiki on rationality
Jürgen Habermas considers his major contribution to be the development of the concept and theory of communicative reason or communicative rationality, which distinguishes itself from the rationalist tradition by locating rationality in structures of interpersonal linguistic communication rather than in the structure of either the cosmos or the knowing subject.

From Wiki on the the public sphere

The public sphere is an area in social life where people can get together and freely discuss and identify societal problems, and through that discussion influence political action. It is “a discursive space in which individuals and groups congregate to discuss matters of mutual interest and, where possible, to reach a common judgment.” The public sphere can be seen as “a theater in modern societies in which political participation is enacted through the medium of talk” and “a realm of social life in which public opinion can be formed”.

Habermas stipulates that, due to specific historical circumstances, a new civic society emerged in the eighteenth century. Driven by a need for open commercial arenas where news and matters of common concern could be freely exchanged and discussed – accompanied by growing rates of literacy, accessibility to literature, and a new kind of critical journalism – a separate domain from ruling authorities started to evolve across Europe. “In its clash with the arcane and bureaucratic practices of the absolutist state, the emergent bourgeoisie gradually replaced a public sphere in which the ruler’s power was merely represented before the people with a sphere in which state authority was publicly monitored through informed and critical discourse by the people”.

In his historical analysis, Habermas points out three so-called “institutional criteria” as preconditions for the emergence of the new public sphere.

1. Disregard of status: Preservation of “a kind of social intercourse that, far from presupposing the equality of status, disregarded status altogether. […] Not that this idea of the public was actually realized in earnest in the coffee houses, salons, and the societies; but as an idea it had become institutionalized and thereby stated as an objective claim. If not realized, it was at least consequential.” (loc.cit.)
2. Domain of common concern: “… discussion within such a public presupposed the problematization of areas that until then had not been questioned. The domain of ‘common concern’ which was the object of public critical attention remained a preserve in which church and state authorities had the monopoly of interpretation. […] The private people for whom the cultural product became available as a commodity profaned it inasmuch as they had to determine its meaning on their own (by way of rational communication with one another), verbalize it, and thus state explicitly what precisely in its implicitness for so long could assert its authority.” (loc.cit.)
3. Inclusivity: However exclusive the public might be in any given instance, it could never close itself off entirely and become consolidated as a clique; for it always understood and found itself immersed within a more inclusive public of all private people, persons who – insofar as they were propertied and educated – as readers, listeners, and spectators could avail themselves via the market of the objects that were subject to discussion. The issues discussed became ‘general’ not merely in their significance, but also in their accessibility: everyone had to be able to participate. […] Wherever the public established itself institutionally as a stable group of discussants, it did not equate itself with the public but at most claimed to act as its mouthpiece, in its name, perhaps even as its educator – the new form of bourgeois representation” (loc.cit.).

On Rationality and Communication:

Communicative action for Habermas is possible given human capacity for rationality. This rationality, however, is “no longer tied to, and limited by, the subjectivistic and individualistic premises of modern philosophy and social theory.”[1] Instead, Habermas situates rationality as a capacity inherent within language, especially in the form of argumentation. “We use the term argumentation for that type of speech in which participants thematize contested validity claims and attempt to vindicate or criticize them through argumentation.”[2] The structures of argumentative speech, which Habermas identifies as the absence of coercive force, the mutual search for understanding, and the compelling power of the better argument, form the key features from which intersubjective rationality can make communication possible. Action undertaken by participants to a process of such argumentative communication can be assessed as to their rationality to the extent which they fulfill those criteria.

And for those who in their ignorance call anything they have not read post-modern- Here is Habermas’ rejection of post-modernism in a nutshell.